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oN The coNTiNUeD viTaLiTY oF SecUriTieS arBiTraTioN
i. intrOdUCtiOn
 It is the rare case when a court will review an arbitration decision, let alone vacate 
an award. However, this is exactly what happened on April 22, 2008 in Barclays Capital 
Inc. v. Shen.1 The issue before the New York trial court was whether the National 
Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) arbitrators awarded the defendant punitive 
damages in manifest disregard of the law.2 In vacating the award in part, the court held 
that both prongs of the “manifest disregard doctrine” had been satisfied because the 
petitioner demonstrated that: “(1) the arbitrator’s [sic] knew of a governing legal 
principle, yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogether and (2) that the law ignored by 
the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.”3 The 
petitioners in this case overcame the almost insurmountable burden that generally 
gives full deference to an arbitrator’s decision and award.4
 What this case highlights is that there are serious problems inherent within the 
securities arbitration industry. The system has been accused of being unfair, biased, and 
utterly opaque.5 These accusations resonate even more loudly during a time when investors 
have many legitimate reasons to question the integrity of the United States marketplace 
and its self-regulated system of dispute resolution.6 From a policy standpoint, these 
1. Barclays Capital Inc. v. Shen, 857 N.Y.S.2d 873 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 2008).
2. Id. Barclays alleged that the NASD arbitrators were aware of and disregarded the holding of Rosenberg 
v. MetLife, Inc., which precludes any monetary damages (including punitive damages) for defamatory 
statements in U-5 filings concerning terminated employees. Id.; see also Rosenberg v. MetLife, Inc., 8 
N.Y.3d 359 (2007).
3. Barclays, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 875 (citing Wallace v. Buttar, 378 F.3d 182 (2d Cir. 2004)). Of note here is the 
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Hall Street Associates v. Mattel, Inc., which directly addresses 
the “manifest disregard of the law” standard as a continuing means for vacating an arbitration decision. 552 
U.S. 576 (2008). The majority opinion held that the Federal Arbitration Act provides the sole statutory 
grounds for vacatur. Id. at 578. The defendants in the case pointed out that the “manifest disregard” standard, 
widely used by courts in reviewing arbitration decisions, is not among the statutory grounds for vacatur. Id. at 
584. While not explicitly upholding the continuing vitality of the “manifest disregard” standard, the Court 
suggested where it may fit into the existing statutory framework. It reasoned:
 Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new ground for review, 
but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to 
them. Or, as some courts have thought, “manifest disregard” may have been 
shorthand for § 10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4), the subsections authorizing vacatur when the 
arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers.”
 Id. at 585.
4. Id. at 583–87; see also J. Kirkland Grant, Securities Arbitration for Brokers, Attorneys, and 
Investors 51–66 (1994).
5. Jill I. Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. Cin. L. 
Rev. 493, 497–98 (2008).
6. Press Release, FINRA, New National Survey Shows Widespread Anxiety Among American Investors 
(News Release) (Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/
P036658. Recent years have seen high-profile accounting frauds associated with the Enron and 
WorldCom scandals. More recently, investors have seen the sub-prime mortgage crisis and the ensuing 
credit crunch that led to the downfall of long-standing institutions Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, and Washington Mutual and the government-backed bailout of AIG, Fannie Mae, and 
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accusations are juxtaposed against a regulatory system that was designed to protect 
investors and to promote market transparency and integrity.7 Although the marketplace 
has changed over the decades, these remain important goals of the securities laws.8
 Today, the operation and regulation of the U.S. markets are even more important 
to the general public because of the average investor’s increased access to the markets 
via online brokerage firms such as E*TRADE and mutual funds.9 Accordingly, 
investor protection has been thrust into the spotlight.10 As a general matter, investors 
benefit from Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) mandated disclosures 
because such rules and regulations create transparency in the marketplace for debt 
and equity instruments and other investment vehicles.11 However, when investments 
take a turn for the worse and small investors seek to bring actions against the industry 
professionals who allegedly caused them harm, the SEC has ironically taken a 
“hands-off ” approach to the arbitration system run by securities-industry insiders.12 
Given the current economic state, investors justifiably feel threatened.13 Nearly every 
investor who opens an account with a brokerage firm must sign a standard form 
agreement that compels the investor to submit to mandatory arbitration in lieu of a 
jury trial should a dispute arise.14 The increasing popularity of mandatory arbitration 
following the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
Freddie Mac. Nelson D. Schwartz, But What of the Small Investor?, N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 2008, at BU2; 
David Goldman, Your $3 Trillion Bailout, CnnMoney.com, Nov. 5, 2008, http://money.cnn.
com/2008/11/05/news/economy/three_trillion_dollar_bailout.
7. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were passed in large response to the 
1929 collapse of the stock market. In large part, the crash was due to speculation on the part of investors 
who had relatively little information about the securities in which they were investing. Therefore, when 
Congress set out to reform the securities markets, disclosure to investors and market transparency became 
the underlying policy goals. Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter & Margaret V. Sachs, Securities 
Litigation and Enforcement 2–3 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter Nagy].
8. SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates 
Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“The mission 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”).
9. Id. (“As more and more first-time investors turn to the markets to help secure their futures, pay for 
homes, and send children to college, our investor protection mission is more compelling than ever.”).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Stephen J. Ware, What Makes Securities Arbitration Different from Other Consumer and Employment 
Arbitration?, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 447, 448–49 (2008) (“The Exchange Act also requires broker-dealers 
to register with, and submit to the rules of, a self regulatory organization (SRO) as a condition of doing 
business. The SEC has authority to regulate broker-dealers, but the bulk of the day-to-day regulation of 
broker-dealers is generally delegated to the SROs by the SEC.”). In fact, the SROs place an affirmative, 
non-contractual duty on the broker-dealers to arbitrate; only investors have the choice of forum if they 
are indeed able to negotiate out of a standard predispute arbitration clause. Id. at 452.
13. See FINRA, supra note 6.
14. No Ban on Brokerage Arbitration Pacts, Chi. Trib., July 10, 1988 at BU11; see also Mark J. Astarita, Esq., 
Securities Laws—Avoiding Customer Disputes, http://www.seclaw.com/avdisp.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 
2010).
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McMahon15 has given rise to a perceived pro-industry, anti-investor bias.16 Although 
arbitration is more often than not an effective and fair means of dispute resolution, 
when injured investors are most in need of SEC-enforced protections, which 
encourage proper disclosure, they are instead met with an arbitration process that 
can appear to be the very antithesis of transparent.
 In response to the growing concern of investors and various activist groups and 
organizations, Congress has taken note of the problems with current mandatory 
arbitration provisions.17 Two main pieces of legislation have found their way onto the 
Congressional f loor: the Fair Arbitration Act of 200718 (“Fair Arbitration Act”) and 
the Arbitration Fairness Act of 200919 (“Arbitration Fairness Act” or “AFA”). While 
the former seeks to keep the current system intact by enacting major reform efforts 
from the inside, the latter goes so far as to render unenforceable all predispute 
arbitration agreements.20 This note argues that arbitration is a viable and necessary 
component of the United States’ securities system and, as such, the Arbitration 
Fairness Act goes too far. Instead, Congress must legislate reform efforts within the 
existing structure to afford meaningful due process to investors unlawfully harmed 
by industry insiders.
 Part II of this note explores the rising popularity of arbitration within the American 
legal system and the current policy of mandatory arbitration in the securities industry. 
Part III examines the Arbitration Fairness Act through the lens of basic contract law 
and argues that the legislation goes too far in overhauling the system by barring 
commercial entities from enforcing mandatory arbitration provisions. Part IV explores 
more effective means of reforming securities arbitration and proposes a new approach. 
15. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
16. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 982.
17. For example, at the Arbitration Fairness Act committee hearing in the House of Representatives, the 
Public Citizen’s Congress Watch Division, a Coffee Beanery franchise owner, and several plaintiffs’ 
lawyers testified as to the concerns of investors regarding mandatory arbitration. Hearing on H.R. 3010, 
the “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007” Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter H.R. 3010 Hearing] (statements of Laura 
MacCleery, Director, Public Citizen’s Congress Watch Division; Deborah Williams, Owner, Coffee 
Beanery Franchise; Theodore G. Eppenstein, Esq., Partner, Eppenstein and Eppenstein). This note 
will rely on the committee testimony stemming from the 2007 bill since committee hearings have not 
yet taken place for the 2009 bill, as discussed infra.
18. Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007). The sponsor of this bill, Republican senator 
Jeff Sessions, also introduced a similar bill in 2002 called the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002. 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002, S. 2026, 107th Cong. (2002). Because the subject of this note concerns 
the Arbitration Fairness Acts of 2007 and 2009, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2002 will not be 
discussed, so as not to confuse the reader with the similarity of name.
19. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009). The Arbitration Fairness Act was 
originally introduced in 2007 under similar language. This note will discuss the 2007 version and the 
2009 version together for general purposes of discussing their proposed effect on the viability of 
predispute arbitration clauses. It will distinguish between the two Acts as is necessary to distinguish the 
additional proposals included within the 2009 version.
20. See id.; see also supra note 17.
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This note concludes that effectuating reform from within the existing structure can 
better ensure meaningful due process to injured investors.
ii. sECUritiEs arbitratiOn in thE UnitEd statEs
 A. Arbitration in the United States Judicial System
 Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) is not a novel process.21 Civilizations as 
far back as the ancient Greeks and Romans sought to resolve disputes through trade 
groups or guilds rather than by turning to the courts for formalized proceedings.22 
This early means of dispute resolution was successful, in part, because the 
particularized groups themselves were governed by informal codes and systems of 
group or professional norms.23 People within a specific group, as insiders, were 
familiar with the norms of their industry and shared “community values.”24 Thus, 
early arbitrators applied the specialized rules governing a particular trade group to 
the respective community and were not expected to follow any sort of per se legal 
precedent.25 Furthermore, arbitration was intended to resolve disputes among industry 
insiders; it was not “a suitable model for a dispute resolution system for non-industry 
members to vindicate statutory rights.”26
 In the United States, arbitration traces its roots back to the colonial times when 
it was primarily used as a means of dispute resolution within commercial 
communities.27 Like other early forms of arbitration, arbitrators were members of a 
particular industry and used industry-specific norms from their own commercial 
community to resolve disputes.28 As such, arbitration existed outside of, and often 
times in tension with, the American legal system.29
21. The New York State Unified Court System defines alternative dispute resolution as including 
“mediation, arbitration and other ways of resolving conflicts with the help of a specially trained neutral 
third party without the need for a formal trial or hearing.” New York State Unified Court System, 
ADR, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/adr/What_Is_ADR.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
22. Katherine V.W. Stone, Arbitration—National, in 1 Encyclopedia of Law & Society: American and 
Global Perspectives 88–92 (David S. Clark ed., 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=781204. 
23. Id.
24. Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets the Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 
N.C. L. Rev. 123, 125 (2005); see also Edward Brunet and Jennifer J. Johnson, Substantive Fairness in 
Securities Arbitration, 76 U. Cin. L. Rev. 459, 460 (2008).
25. See Johnson, supra note 24, at 125.
26. Id.
27. Stone, supra note 22, at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. This legal tension was embodied in the early common law rule of revocability. During this time, 
courts did not give legal significance to arbitration agreements because it was said that “agreements to 
arbitrate were revocable by either party until the arbitral award was rendered.” Id. at 3. This meant that 
if either party wished to bring a legal suit instead of submitting to arbitration, no court would compel 
the arbitration, despite any existing contract compelling the arbitration. Id. at 3–4.
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 However, the turn of the twentieth century saw a rise in commercial activity, and 
commercial lawyers saw the need for legal acceptance of arbitration as an essential 
means of speedy resolution of commercial disputes.30 New York State was at the 
forefront of this campaign.31 In 1920, the New York State Legislature passed the 
New York Arbitration Act, which made arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable save on such grounds as exist at Law or in Equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”32 Following subsequent United States congressional hearings and 
debate, Congress adopted into law the United States Arbitration Act, a statute 
ref lecting the language and underlying policy considerations of the New York 
statute.33 From its conception, American commercial arbitration has ref lected the 
business community’s need to have a fast, industry-driven means of dispute resolution 
that operates alongside, and with due respect from, the judicial system.34 Modern 
ADR models have continued to evolve and now exist as wide-scale mediation centers 
and arbitration associations that serve the particularized necessities of a fast-paced 
society.35
30. Id. at 4.
31. Id.
32. Id. This Act is still in force, and is codified in Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. §§ 7501–7514 (McKinney 1998).
33. Stone, supra note 22, at 4. Congress debated and considered the Illinois approach, which rejected 
enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses but permitted enforcement of arbitration agreements that 
were made between parties following a dispute. Id.
34. Id. at 4–5.
35. “The American Arbitration Association was founded in 1926, following enactment of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, with the specific goal of helping to implement arbitration as an out-of-court solution to 
resolving disputes. This legal framework was passed by Congress and signed by President Calvin 
Coolidge.” American Arbitration Association, AAA Mission and Principles, http://www.adr.org/aaa_
mission (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). “The AAA’s staff members and neutrals continue to live out the 
principles on which the Association was founded.” Id. Current leading arbitration mediation institutions 
include: the American Arbitration Association, the National Arbitration Forum, and JAMS. See, e.g., 
American Arbitration Association, http://www.adr.org (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); National Arbitration 
Forum, http://www.adrforum.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); JAMS Alternative Dispute Resolution, 
http://www.jamsadr.com (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). One argument against arbitration is that it is 
f lawed because inexperienced investors and sophisticated businessmen are not members of the same 
community, as was the case in early arbitration models. However, Congress made the conscious policy 
decision to expand from this model when it adopted the United States Arbitration Act (now Federal 
Arbitration Act) and developed a model of arbitration that is given independent legal significance 
through legal oversight. See Stone, supra note 22, at 4. This model of legal oversight exists in various 
forms throughout the greater business community. For example, lawyers practicing before the SEC are 
bound by the rules of the respective national securities exchange, which is in turn subject to SEC 
oversight. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (2006). Broker dealers must 
register with the SEC. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78e (2006). Furthermore, 
individual registered representatives of a broker dealer are required to pass certification tests such as the 
General Securities Representative Exam (“Series 7”) and the Uniform Securities Agent State Law 
Examination (“Series 63”). FINRA, Inc., FINRA Registration and Examination Requirements, http://
www.finra.org/RegistrationQualif ications/BrokerGuidanceResponsibility/Qualif ications/p011051 
(last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
1137
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
B. Arbitration within the Securities Context
  1. Regulatory Bodies
 Arbitration of claims within the securities industry dates back to 1845 at the 
New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”).36 Throughout the modern era, most disputes 
have been arbitrated by the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) 
following “standard form-pad customer and employment agreements.”37 An industry-
wide set of rules, however, was not a feature of the various self-regulatory organizations 
(“SRO”) until the mid-1970s. The impetus came in 1975 when congressional 
amendments to the securities laws gave the SEC oversight of SRO securities 
arbitration.38 In June 1976, the SEC solicited comments regarding the creation of a 
“uniform system of dispute grievance procedures for the adjudication of small 
claims.”39 Afterward, in April 1977, the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration 
(“SICA”) was established to develop such a system of rules.40 The uniform code 
produced by SICA was largely adopted by industry SROs from 1979–1980.41 A major 
change, however, hit the securities industry in July 2007 when the SEC consolidated 
SRO oversight of the exchanges to the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”), a combined organization merging the former-NASD and the regulatory 
arm of the NYSE.42 This merger was meant to increase investor confidence and to 
improve market stability by centralizing oversight into one board with a consolidated 
set of rules.43 Today, most securities arbitration takes place through FINRA under a 
uniform, industry-wide, and SEC-regulated set of rules.44
  2. Judicial Treatment of Securities Arbitration
 Arbitration was given particular legal significance in 1925 when Congress passed 
the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”).45 The Act as a whole requires courts to enforce 
36. Johnson, supra note 24, at 136.
37. Grant, supra, note 4, at 94.
38. Id. at 143.
39. Constantine N. Katsoris, Roadmap to Securities ADR, 11 Fordham Jour. of Corp. and Fin. L. 413, 
420 (2006).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 422.
42. Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA (News Release) (July 30, 2007), available at http://www.
finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329.
43. Id.
44. FINRA – Overview, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Overview/index.
htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“Today, FINRA is known as the largest and most effective dispute 
resolution forum in the securities industry—handling virtually all such arbitrations and mediations in 
the United States.”). Additionally, FINRA rules are subject to SEC oversight and approval. Id.
45. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also Johnson, supra note 24, at 127.
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arbitration agreements just as they enforce other contractual provisions.46 In particular, 
section 2 of the FAA provides that predispute arbitration agreements are “valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”47 Initially, the Supreme Court was skeptical of predispute 
arbitration clauses as applied to the “investor-protective provisions” of the Securities 
Act of 1933.48 The first case where the Court was asked to interpret congressional 
intent regarding securities laws and arbitration came in 1953 with Wilko v. Swan.49 
There, the Court expressed doubt regarding the existing arbitration procedures within 
the securities industry and held that notwithstanding the FAA, the Securities Act 
reflected a congressional intent favoring judicial enforcement of the statutory investor 
protections.50 However, subsequent decisions incrementally narrowed the Wilko 
exception to the FAA, eventually overruling it.51 Thus, the Court’s early interpretations 
of congressional intent behind securities laws with respect to arbitration clauses were 
quite protective of the judiciary; however, following Wilko and its progeny, the Court 
departed from this protectionist trend and found that arbitration was suitable, if not 
preferable, for other federally created investor causes of action.52
 In the seminal case of Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, the Supreme 
Court upheld a predispute arbitration agreement in an action arising under the 
Securities Exchange Act.53 In effect, this decision changed the judicial course to one 
that embraced a “new pro-arbitration philosophy.”54 The McMahon majority held 
that claims arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act were arbitrable 
46. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
47. Id. This language is adopted from the language enacted by the New York State Legislature in the New 
York Arbitration Act. Supra notes 32–33. See also Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 
(1974) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 96, at 1–2 (1924)) (“The Act was intended to ‘revers[e] centuries of 
judicial hostility to arbitration agreements,’ to allow parties to avoid ‘the costliness and delays of 
litigation,’ and to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”).
48. Grant, supra note 4, at 113.
49. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
50. Id. at 438 (holding a predispute agreement to arbitrate unenforceable, notwithstanding contrary 
authority in the FAA, since the agreement was found to have violated pubic policy); see also Johnson, 
supra note 24, at 127–28.
51. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (overruling Wilko); see also 
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519–20 (holding an arbitration clause enforceable in the context of an international 
agreement notwithstanding the fact that the claim was brought as a violation of section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act); Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) 
(holding that an antitrust dispute brought under the Sherman Act was arbitrable under the Federal 
Arbitration Act).
52. Grant, supra note 4, at 117.
53. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238.
54. Johnson, supra note 24, at 128; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238 (concluding that Congress did not 
intend section 29(a) of the Exchange Act to bar enforcement of all predispute arbitration agreements 
and thus holding McMahons’ agreements to arbitrate enforceable).
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under predispute arbitration agreements.55 The Court further refined judicial 
acceptance of arbitration in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.56 The 
Court examined the public policy considerations underlying the Wilko decision, 
finding that the cardinal fear of the Wilko Court had been that “[e]ven though the 
provisions of the Securities Act apply, their effectiveness in application is lessened in 
arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings.”57 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion 
for the Rodriguez Court held that this suspicion—that arbitration weakens the 
protections of substantive securities laws to putative plaintiffs—was “out of step” 
with contemporary favor for arbitration as a method of dispute resolution.58 Given 
the modern proliferation of organized arbitration forums and the significant oversight 
and rules governing arbitration procedure, today’s Court no longer shares the Wilko 
Court’s suspicions.59 Indeed, the percentage of broker-dealers that have added 
predispute arbitration clauses to cash account agreements has risen from a pre-
McMahon level of 39% to virtually all broker-dealers today.60
  3. Rules and Regulations
 Arbitration is touted by its proponents as a quick and inexpensive alternative to 
litigation.61 Although the process shares certain features with traditional litigation,62 
it is presided over not by judges but by arbitrators.63 Under the FINRA consolidated 
55. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 237–38.
56. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 477.
57. Id. at 481; see also Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435.
58. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481.
59. As far back as McMahon, the Supreme Court noted that when Wilko was handed down, the SEC did not 
have the same authority over the SROs as it did at the time of McMahon. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233–34. 
Today, the SEC has considerable authority over FINRA rules governing arbitration procedures. See 
generally Thomas Lee Hazen, Principles of Securities Regulation, 324–30 (2d ed. 2006). In 
retaining supervisory authority, the SEC ensures adequate procedure in the arbitration process. McMahon, 
482 U.S. at 233–34; see also Grant, supra note 4, at 122 (“Finding Wilko concerned primarily with the 
procedural protection of litigation, the Court concluded, again in light of the SEC’s recently expanded 
authority ‘to oversee and regulate those arbitration procedures,’ the Wilko rationale no longer existed.”).
60. Gross, supra note 5, at 494, n.8 (citing Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes by the NYSE, NASD, 
and AMEX Relating to the Arbitration Process and the Use of Predispute Arbitration Clauses, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 21, 144, 21, 153 n.51 (May 10, 1989)); see also Grant, supra note 4, at XXVI.
61. FINRA, Arbitration Procedures: What is Arbitration?, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009532 (last visited Feb 26, 2010).
62. Some have argued that the arbitration process has gradually become so much like litigation that 
arbitration now resembles a slightly modified version of a litigation proceeding itself. For a more detailed 
discussion of this proposition and the dangers associated therein, see Grant, supra note 4, at 315 (“[T]he 
danger is that the SRO procedures would become too similar to litigation. To make arbitration more 
formal would be to have it more similar to the institution it seeks to replace—the court. The result will 
be another legal institution.”).
63. FINRA, Arbitration Procedures: Who are the Arbitrators?, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009534 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). FINRA describes 
arbitrators as “impartial persons who are knowledgeable in securities industry disputes.” Id.
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rules, parties participate in the arbitrator selection process by ranking candidates on, 
or striking them from, a list automatically generated by the Neutral List Selection 
System.64 FINRA staff then uses input from both parties to select neutral arbitrators.65 
Similar to the litigation process, arbitration involves an adversarial hearing. 66 The 
parties to an arbitration proceeding present their cases to the arbitrator through 
testimony and documentary evidence.67 However, unlike a traditional court 
proceeding, arbitration does not follow strict rules of evidence.68 Following the 
arbitration hearing, the arbitrators deliberate, decide the outcome of the case, and 
then issue an arbitration “award” to the parties involved.69 Importantly, arbitration 
awards, unlike court decisions, generally do not contain a detailed explanation of the 
arbitrators’ rationale and findings and are never memorialized as a published, written 
opinion.70 In large part, the non-requirement for published rationales is due to the 
roots of arbitration growing out of equitable forums and not courts of law.71 A 
practical effect of this non-requirement is that arbitration awards are not available, 
and moreover cannot be used, as precedent.72
 In 2009, a total of 7137 cases were filed through FINRA dispute resolution and 
4571 of those cases were closed through arbitration.73 Industry-prepared statistics 
state that “[i]n 2009, approximately 70% of customer claimant cases resulted, through 
settlement or awards, in monetary or non-monetary recovery for the investor.”74 The 
average turnaround time for cases decided by a full hearing was 16.6 months.75
64. FINRA, Arbitration Procedures: Appointment of the Arbitrators , http://www.f inra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009538 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
65. Id.
66. FINRA, Arbitration Procedures: How Are the Hearings Conducted?, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/Parties/Overview/ArbitrationProcedures/P009542 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
67. Id.
68. FINRA, Code of Arbitration Procedure for Indus. Disputes § 13604 (2010); FINRA, Code of 
Arbitration Procedure for Customer Disputes § 12604 (2010).
69. FINRA, Arbitration Case Flow Definitions, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Neutrals/
ArbitrationProcess/ArbitrationCaseFlow/ArbitrationCaseFlowDefinitions/index.htm#9 (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2010).
70. Id.
71. Barbara Black & Jill Gross, The Explained Award of Damocles: Protection or Peril in Securities Arbitration, 
34 Sec. Reg. L.J. 2 (2006). “Arbitration is considered a forum of equity, as arbitrators may consider 
‘common sense notions of fairness’ and other equitable factors when resolving disputes before them. 
This focus on equity has been a benefit of securities arbitration for investors, because the law is not 
investor-friendly in many jurisdictions.” Id.
72. Id.
73. FINRA Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/
Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
74. Id. It should be noted that the amount of recovery as compared to the damages actually claimed by the 
injured investors is not provided.
75. Id. FINRA notes in its statistics that “[t]he timing of the arbitration process is heavily inf luence by Code 
of Arbitration Procedures time limits, the parties, and the panel.” Id. In simple cases where the 
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III. ThE ArbITrATIOn FAIrnEss AcT OF 2009
 The 2007 version of the Arbitration Fairness Act was introduced in Congress on 
July 12, 2007 by Senator Russ Feingold (D-Wisc.) and Representative Hank Johnson 
(D-Ga.).76 Following its introduction in the House of Representatives, the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law 
held a hearing on the proposed Act on October 25, 2007.77 Shortly thereafter, the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on the Constitution held its 
hearing on December 12, 2007.78 After moving no further in the legislation process 
than the 2007 Subcommittee hearings, the Arbitration Fairness Act was redrafted 
and reintroduced in 2009—on February 12th in the House and on April 29th in the 
Senate.
 As proposed, the Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009 seeks, in part, to amend the 
FAA to exclude arbitration agreements in contracts involving “an employment, 
consumer, or franchise dispute,” or “a dispute arising under any statute intended to 
protect civil rights.”79 The bill itself provides:
(b) No predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable 
if it requires arbitration of—
 (1) an employment, consumer, or franchise dispute; or
 (2)  a dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil 
rights.80
The Senate version of the legislation is substantially the same as the House version; 
however, it also includes “services relating to securities and other investments” to its 
definition of the term “consumer dispute.”81 The bill thus leaves no doubt that its 
drafters intend to sweep securities regulation within the ambit of the proposed 
reforms.
 As the legislation currently stands, the bill does not completely bar arbitration 
agreements; most notably, it does not bar disputes between investors and securities 
brokerage firms. What the bill does, however, is require that parties of unequal 
arbitrators need only review the relevant party documents, the turnaround time was 6.6 months. 
Combined, the average turnaround time for all cases in 2009 was 12.4 months. Id.
76. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
77. H.R. 3010 Hearing, supra note 17.
78. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter S. 1782 Hearing]. This note will rely on the 
testimony presented during the 2007 hearings since hearings have not yet been held on the 2009 version 
of the proposed Act.
79. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009).
80. Id. The 2007 version of the AFA contained the same provision, but in subsection (b)(2) inserted “or to 
regulate contracts or transactions between parties of unequal bargaining power” following “civil rights.” 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007).
81. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
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bargaining power agree to submit to arbitration only after a dispute arises.82 According 
to Senator Feingold, the Arbitration Fairness Act seeks to “[ref lect] the FAA’s 
original intent by requiring that agreements to arbitrate employment, consumer, 
franchise, or civil rights disputes be made after the dispute has arisen.”83 The bill’s 
proponents argue that it will give small investors a “true choice” in deciding whether 
to arbitrate or to go forward with traditional civil litigation.84
 The 2009 proposal is quite a departure from the approach the drafters took when 
submitting the 2007 version of the bill. The current bill proposes an additional 
provision that purports to give jurisdiction to the federal courts to determine whether 
an agreement to arbitrate is valid and enforceable.85 Presently, this issue is decided by 
the arbitrator under the doctrine of “competence-competence.”86 Effectively, the 
addition of this provision would allow any party to dispute jurisdiction of the arbitrators, 
for example, by alleging fraudulent inducement of the original contract.87 In practical 
terms, it would give a losing party an unhindered right to appeal to the courts, an effect 
that would “potentially jeopardiz[e] some of the efficiencies of arbitration.”88
 In sum, there are several distinctive bill provisions that have the potential to 
inflict severe harm on dispute resolution within the securities industry. First, the bill 
seeks to prohibit parties with unequal bargaining power within an employment, 
consumer, or franchise relationship from contractually agreeing to presubmit to 
binding, mandatory arbitration.89 Second, the bill goes even further by “retroactively 
invalidating” existing contracts that contain binding arbitration clauses.90 Finally, the 
bill seeks to vest exclusive jurisdiction with the courts, rather than the arbitrator, to 
determine the “validity or enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate.”91 In examining 
the issues with the above-stated provisions of the AFA, a threshold consideration is 
that arbitration exists as a “creature of contract.”92 A given party’s intent to cede civil 
82. Russ Feingold, U.S. Senator (D-Wisc.), Introduction of Consumer Justice Legislation: Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2009 (Apr. 29, 2009), available at http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=312222&.
83. Id. But see supra text accompanying note 33 (discussing Congress’s rejection of the Illinois approach in favor 
of the “New York approach,” an approach which permitted enforcement of predispute arbitration clauses).
84. Feingold, supra note 82.
85. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2009, S. 931, 111th Cong. (2009).
86. See Congress Considers “Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009,” Stay Current (Paul Hastings, New York, 
N.Y.), March 2009, available at http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1255.pdf [hereinafter 
Paul Hastings Alert] (“[The doctrine] provides that parties are entitled to vest arbitrators with the power 
to determine their own jurisdiction.”).
87. See id.
88. Id. The efficiencies jeopardized include: finality of an arbitrator’s decision and the threat of unrestricted 
judicial appeal.
89. See id.; see also Op-ed, No Lawyers, Please, Wall St. J., Apr. 5, 2008 at A8.
90. See No Lawyers, Please, supra note 89.
91. Paul Hastings Alert, supra note 86, at 2.
92. Grant, supra note 4, at 11.
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jurisdiction in favor of private arbitration can be made evident only by contractual 
agreement.93 In other words, “[arbitration’s] jurisdiction arises from and is based on 
voluntary agreement of the parties, or their contract.”94 As such, traditional principles 
and philosophies underlying basic contract law are of the utmost importance in 
considering any legal aspect of arbitration. Thus, at the most fundamental level, the 
issue is that the cited provisions of the Arbitration Fairness Act are diametrically 
opposed to the basic principles underlying the nature of a contractual agreement, 
namely freedom of contract and certainty of contract.
A. Freedom of Contract
 It is a basic tenet of contract law that parties have the freedom of contract.95 
However, in modern society, such freedom has been substantially restricted. With 
the rise of privatization, freedom of contract has been reduced as part of a necessary 
compromise. Private citizens lose full freedom to contract as they wish; however, 
they gain the benefits associated with standardization of contract throughout society 
as a whole.96 That is, society and its industries are regulated through such 
standardization as Congress and other regulatory bodies legislate in an effort to 
mandate the standard terms that may govern the dealings between various people 
and industries.97 As more and more dealings and relationships become standardized 
into uniform procedures and contracts, regulators have a greater ability to shape the 
terms, thereby giving the coordinating ability to level the playing field for all parties 
involved.98 Applying these concepts to the field of securities arbitration, standardization 
of broker-dealer contacts, including mandatory arbitration clause provisions, both 
permits a balance between the needs of brokerage firms and private investors and 
maximizes the greater societal gains.99
 Investors have argued that not only does mandatory arbitration deprive them of 
the freedom of contract, but also that this “freedom” is illusory to the extent that 
so-called arbitration “agreements” are unconscionable contracts of adhesion, and 
93. See id.
94. Id. at 13.
95. 1 E. Allan Farnsworth, Farnsworth on Contracts § 1.7 (Aspen Publishers 3d ed. 2004). For an 
optimistic perspective on how freedom of contract has allowed for the progression of society, see id. 
(citing H. Maine, Ancient Law 170 (1861)) (“[W]e may say that the movement of the progressive 
societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”).
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. To this end, it has been said that government best serves the interests of its citizens when the system 
“acts with a reasonable degree of uniformity.” 1 Arthur Linton Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 
1.1, at 2 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., Yale University 1993).
99. See generally Grant, supra note 4, at 100–01 (discussing the brokerage industry as an oligopolistic 
industry where regulation comes both from the outside (federal statutes; SEC regulations) and from the 
inside (self-imposed SRO regulations)). 
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therefore unenforceable.100 This is essentially the same argument underlying the 
provision of the Arbitration Fairness Act that would invalidate a predispute arbitration 
agreement regulating a contract that was made between parties of unequal bargaining 
power.101 The assertion is correct to the extent that no one could argue that the 
average investor and industry-regulated broker-dealer negotiate at “arm’s length.” 
However, courts repeatedly have held that the consumer-industry relationships 
typifying those found within the securities arbitration context are not so unduly 
oppressive as to render a predispute arbitration clause void.102
 Upholding mandatory binding arbitration makes sense from both a practical 
perspective and a public policy standpoint. The business realities of a fast-paced and 
market-driven economy require the use of a standard-form contract.103 Admittedly, 
this generally means that small investors with little bargaining power are forced to 
give up some freedom in making the economic decision to invest in the markets.104 
However, after the major Supreme Court cases of McMahon and Rodriguez and the 
clear federal policy favoring arbitration, no investor could claim that he or she was 
not on notice that predispute arbitration clauses are the industry norm.105 Knowing 
this, investors are free to choose to submit to the arbitration clause, thereby enjoying 
the benefits associated with capitalism and a free marketplace. Investors are equally 
free, however, to pursue the alternate, yet equally free choice to invest by other 
means—that is to say, no one forces the hand of the investor into the stock market or 
100. See id. at 29; Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 208 (1981) (“If a contract or term thereof is 
unconscionable at the time the contract is made a court may refuse to enforce the contract, or may 
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable term, or may so limit the application 
of any unconscionable term as to avoid any unconscionable result.”).
101. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong § 4(4) (2007).
102. Grant, supra note 4, at 30; see also McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226 (“’[W]e are well past the time when judicial 
suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals’ should inhibit 
enforcement of the [Arbitration] Act ‘in controversies based on statutes.’” (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 
473 U.S. at 626–27; Wilko, 346 U.S. at 432; Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 481 (reasoning that section 14 does not 
prohibit “agreements to arbitrate future disputes relating to the purchase of securities.”)).
103. See Grant, supra note 4, at 99.
 The brokerage firms have created standard form contracts for several purposes. The 
standard contract will reduce administrative and transaction costs. This may result in 
lower prices for the consumer. Standardization also promotes efficiency within the 
large organization and promotes efficient use of managerial and legal resources, as well 
as acting as a check on wayward behavior.
 Id. Furthermore, as discussed supra, standardization of broker-dealer contracts has allowed the securities 
industry to be regulated. This regulation arguably allows for more investor protection than if the industry 
were left unregulated. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.
104. Although federal policy favors arbitration, courts have been an ally to investors where principles of state 
law would otherwise protect the party with less bargaining power from undue oppression from the 
stronger party. See, e.g., Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir. 2001). That is, there 
are clear judicial limits that prohibit the party with greater bargaining power from being unduly 
oppressive in its dealings with its weaker counterparties.
105. Grant, supra note 4, at 30.
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other financial investments.106 Finally, legislative policy choices and subsequent 
judicial interpretations have made clear that the advantages of a thriving stock market 
outweigh the small investor’s loss of freedom in choosing to submit to a brokerage 
contract containing an arbitration clause.107
 Even acknowledging that industry professionals have the upper hand in drafting 
the brokerage contract agreements, there is empirical evidence to suggest that the 
investing public favors arbitration.108 In a fast-paced world (none more so than Wall 
Street), going through the formal litigation process is often not a viable option for 
investors for both temporal and economic reasons.109 In fact, a recent poll released on 
behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce affirms that Americans prefer “cheaper 
and faster methods of settling arguments.”110 An overwhelming 82% of those 
surveyed chose arbitration as the way they would prefer to settle a business dispute as 
compared to the 15% who chose litigation.111 Among the reasons cited were: (i) 
saving time by arbitrating rather than litigating, and (ii) avoiding the heightened 
expenses associated with litigating in a court of law.112 By completely barring 
mandatory arbitration as a viable option, the Arbitration Fairness Act takes away an 
industry-wide standard and a public-preferred means of dispute resolution.113 In its 
106. Courts have generally supported predispute arbitration clauses under the principles of freedom of 
contract. Id. at 11.
107. See id. at 30. (“[T]he strong public policy favoring arbitration and economies of standardized contracts 
requires a heavy burden (similar to summary judgment) of the one seeking to avoid it by establishing 
unconscionability.”); see also Edward J. Murphy, Richard E. Speidel & Ian Ayres, Studies in 
Contract Law 4 (6th ed. 2003) (“One cannot gainsay the importance of freedom of contract to a 
market economy and the relative superiority of such a system to unproductive command economies 
which are, seemingly, in decline throughout the world today.”).
108. No Lawyers, Please, supra note 89.
109. See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and 
Administrative Law and the H. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 7–8 (2007) [hereinafter Rutledge 
Testimony] (testimony of Peter B. Rutledge, Associate Professor of Law, Columbus School of Law, 
Catholic University of America). Professor Rutledge argues that an additional reason eliminating 
litigation as a viable option is that lawyers are unwilling to take cases to court unless “the amount in 
controversy is sufficiently high and the merits sufficiently strong.” Id. at 7–8 (citing David Sherwyn et 
al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitration: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 
1557, 1574 (2005)). Empirical evidence within the employment arbitration context showed that over 
95% of claimants were turned away from representation. Id. (citing Lewis Maltby, Employment 
Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 105, 107 (2003)).
110. No Lawyers, Please, supra note 89.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. It has been suggested that if the public prefers arbitration, injured investors would still agree to it in the 
absence of mandatory clauses. However, what this argument fails to consider is the emotional, human 
element that naturally arises when one’s investments have turned sour, especially if they turned sour 
unlawfully at the hands of a securities broker. Reacting on raw emotion, the investor’s reaction would 
mirror the stereotypical person slamming the door while screaming, “I’ll see you in court!” Thus while 
intentional or unintentional, by requiring investors and brokerage firms to agree to arbitrate after a dispute, 
the Arbitration Fairness Act would most likely lead investors to flood the courts with complaints.
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wake, the Arbitration Fairness Act would leave behind the potential for a f lood of 
litigation, because absent complete agreement between the parties, the only remaining 
forum would be the courts.114
 B. Certainty of Contract
 A second fundamental tenet of contract law called into question by the Arbitration 
Fairness Act is that of legal certainty and predictability. People enter into contracts 
as a means of protecting the expectations they intend to realize when entering into a 
promise with another party.115 “[T]o promote and facilitate reliance on agreements,” 
the law protects the expectation interests inherent within a contractual agreement.116 
The great legal scholar Roscoe Pound proposed that the “whole economic order” 
rests on the presupposition that promises will be kept and that “the whole social 
order rests upon stability and predictability of conduct, of which keeping promises is 
a large item.”117
 Over time, modern contract law has evolved by attempting to standardize the 
common law rules of contract into workable forms such as those model rules set 
forth in the Restatements and the Uniform Commercial Code.118 Various industries 
have also standardized the rules that govern inter-party relationships. By developing 
a system of written rules that governs the relationship between various parties, 
individuals entering into a contract have a clear understanding of what to expect 
with respect to honoring and enforcing their agreed upon contractual provisions.119
 Federal case law since McMahon has made clear that there is a judicial preference 
for arbitration of securities disputes.120 Likewise, the rules governing the relationship 
between an investor and a brokerage firm are exceedingly clear with respect to 
predispute arbitration agreements. At the SRO level, FINRA rules spell out the 
governing principles for arbitration procedures with great specificity.121 Yet even if an 
114. The potential effect on the civil court dockets would be staggering. Through December 2009, 7137 
cases were filed during the year at FINRA, a number on the rise. FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, 
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 
26, 2010).
115. Corbin, supra note 98, § 1.1.
116. Id. (citing Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 Yale 
L.J. 52, 59–62 (1936)).
117. Murphy et al., supra note 107, at 3 (quoting 3 Pound, Jurisprudence 162–63 (1959)).
118. Farnsworth, supra note 95. “But the shape of modern contract law is due in good part to the scholars 
whose treatises and other writings brought order out of the growing mass of cases.” Id.
119. See id.
120. Grant, supra note 4, at 30; see also Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 477.
121. FINRA’s Code of Arbitration Procedure and Code of Mediation Procedure were recently revised 
following the consolidation of the NASD and the regulatory arm of the NYSE. The Code of Arbitration 
Procedure has been divided into the Customer Code and the Industry Code. The rules are accessible 
through FINRA’s website. FINRA – Arbitration & Mediation Rules, http://www.finra.org/
ArbitrationMediation/Rules/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
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investor were not familiar with the case law or with the more technical FINRA 
rules, SRO-imposed regulations take the extra step to ensure that investors have 
been made aware of their agreement to arbitrate when they sign their brokerage firm 
customer agreement.122
 Within the otherwise boilerplate contract language, the brokerage firm must 
take great care to highlight the predispute arbitration clause.123 Generally, this means 
that the clause is set out in a substantially larger font than the rest of the document 
and in boldface type.124 Additionally, just above an investor’s signature line, there 
must be a statement reminding the investor that the agreement contains a predispute 
arbitration clause.125 Finally, any customer signing an agreement containing such a 
clause must be given a copy of the agreement and must acknowledge receipt of the 
agreement on a separate document.126 Given this comprehensive disclosure, parties 
know the rules that protect their expectation interests.
 Despite the existence of clear rules governing the system, the Arbitration Fairness 
Act seeks to render unenforceable all pre-existing binding arbitration clauses.127 
While there is no reliable estimate of the number of brokerage accounts that currently 
exist in the United States, even a decade ago, U.S. online brokerage accounts alone 
numbered eighteen million.128 Because nearly all customer agreements contain a 
122. The SICA-proposed rules governing predispute arbitration agreements became section 31 of its Uniform 
Code of Arbitration, which was both approved by the SEC and adopted by the various SROs in the 
securities industry. Grant, supra note 4, at 75. While FINRA continues through its transition period 
in developing a consolidated rule book, the pertinent regulation is NASD Manual, Rule 3110(f). 
FINRA Manual Online, NASD Rules, http://f inra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.
html?rbid=2403&element_id=3734 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
123. Id. (“Any predispute arbitration clause shall be highlighted and shall be immediately preceded by the 
following language [provisions of arbitration agreement] in outline form.”).
124. See, e.g., Grant, supra note 4, at 81–82.
125. NASD Rule 3110(f)(2)(A). FINRA Manual Online, NASD Rules, http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3734 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“In any agreement 
containing a predispute arbitration agreement, there shall be a highlighted statement immediately 
preceding any signature line or other place for indicating agreement that states that the agreement 
contains a predispute arbitration clause. The statement shall also indicate at what page and paragraph 
the arbitration clause is located.”).
126. NASD Rule 3110(f)(2)(B). FINRA Manual Online, NASD Rules, http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=3734 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“Within thirty 
days of signing, a copy of the agreement containing any such clause shall be given to the customer who 
shall acknowledge receipt thereof on the agreement or on a separate document.”).
127. S. 1782 Hearing, supra note 78. According to Senator Russ Feingold, “What this bill does is ensure that 
citizens once again have a true choice between arbitration and the traditional civil court system by 
making unenforceable any predispute agreement that requires arbitration of a consumer, employment, 
or franchise dispute.” Russ Feingold, U.S. Senator (D-Wisc.), Opening Statement: Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on the Constitution Hearing on “The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007” (Dec. 12, 2007), 
available at http://feingold.senate.gov/statements/07/12/20071212.htm.
128. E-Trade Craze Hits Europe: Number of Brokerage Accounts Doubles in 6 Months, Int’l Herald Trib., Aug. 
12, 2000, available at 2000 WL 3309303.
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predispute arbitration clause, the Arbitration Fairness Act would affect hundreds of 
millions of investors.129
 In addition, the Arbitration Fairness Act would greatly affect the legal system. 
Under the Act, unless both parties agree to submit a dispute to arbitration after it 
arises,130 courts will be forced to consider the claims from investors against their 
broker-dealers that would have formerly been handled through arbitration.131 If the 
majority of injured investors proceeded in litigating their claim rather than arbitrating, 
the impact on the courts would be dramatic. In 2008 alone, 4982 cases were filed for 
arbitration at FINRA.132 However, with the recent proliferation of investor claims 
surrounding the sub-prime mortgage/auction-rate security crisis, 7137 cases were 
filed in 2009 and came close to the 8945 cases that were filed at the height of the 
dot-com boom.133 To add these cases to civil court dockets would not only disrupt 
the contractual expectations of investors and brokers, but would also overwhelm the 
unsuspecting civil court systems with securities claims from injured investors.134
 Finally, disrupting the system risks sending the investing public a message that 
the system is broken beyond repair—that in judicially favoring arbitration of investors’ 
securities claims since McMahon, the government has failed to protect investors with 
a fair system of dispute resolution. As argued by the American Arbitration 
Association, the AFA’s mandated “[m]odification would unnecessarily send a message 
of ambiguity and policy hostility to arbitration to the international [and national] 
community. Companion legislation can accomplish the goals of Congress, without 
disruption to a venerable and successful process.”135
129. No Ban, supra note 14.
130. The gravamen of the AFA is that it would disallow predispute agreements to arbitrate between parties 
of unequal bargaining power. It would, however, allow the parties to agree to submit to arbitration after 
a dispute had already arisen. See H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
131. Of course, this assumes that injured investors would be able to find adequate legal representation. That 
is, these injured investors are more likely to be individuals, and members of the plaintiffs’ bar are likely 
to require a contingency fee. Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007); see also 148 
Cong. Rec. S9720–23 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions); Rutledge Testimony, supra 
note 109 (citing Lewis Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. Rev. 105, 107 
(2003)). In practical terms, this means that if the plaintiff ’s expected damages do not reach a certain 
threshold, lawyers will be forced to turn down even those who have viable claims. Fair Arbitration Act 
of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007). According to a recent survey of members of the plaintiffs’ bar, “a 
prospective plaintiff need[s] to have a minimum of $60,000 in provable damages . . . before an attorney 
would take the case.” Id.
132. FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/
Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 114.
133. FINRA, Dispute Resolution Statistics, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/AboutFINRADR/
Statistics/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); see also supra text accompanying note 114.
134. See supra Part III.A.
135. H.R. 3010 Hearing, supra note 17 (testimony of Richard Naimark, Senior Vice President, Am. Arb., 
Ass’n).
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iV. rEfOrM: rEstOring inVEstOr COnfidEnCE
 A. Recognized Problems within the Current System
 Since the Supreme Court upheld mandatory arbitration clauses in McMahon, 
investors have become increasingly wary of the industry-sponsored arbitration process 
that they claim is tilted in favor of the securities industry.136 Senator Feingold has 
attacked the current system of mandatory arbitration as depriving Americans of their 
day in court.137 Rather than act to deprive injured investors, he has argued that 
arbitration be used only if it is desired by both the investor and the broker-dealer at the 
time that the dispute arises.138 His rationale is that because it is not per se accountable 
to a higher authority, the arbitration system favors big business and is unfair to the 
average investor.139 His solution is not to better regulate the existing system, thereby 
making it accountable;140 but rather, it is to destroy the existing system entirely.141
 As discussed, his proposed bill, the Arbitration Fairness Act, is inexorably flawed as 
being antithetical to fundamental underpinnings of contract law.142 Where Senator 
Feingold is correct, however, is in recognizing that a lack of investor confidence in the 
current securities dispute resolution system is harmful both to the American market and 
to the investors that the market serves.143 A common complaint of investors is the lack of 
transparency in arbitration, because arbitrators are not required to provide an opinion or 
rationale in issuing an award.144 In response, the former-NASD proposed, but ultimately 
did not adopt, a rule change in July 2005 that would have required arbitrators to provide 
written explanations of awards upon a customer’s request.145 Upon release of the proposal, 
NASD Chair and CEO Robert R. Glauber explained, “[w]e have found that investors 
want to know more about how a panel reaches its decision . . . [b]y giving investors the 
option of requiring a written explanation of an arbitration panel’s decision, we will 
increase investor confidence in the fairness of the NASD arbitration process.”146
136. Black & Gross, supra note 71.





142. See discussion supra Part III.
143. See SEC, The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
144. Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Ilya Torchinsky, Explaining “Explained Decisions”: NASD’s Proposal for 
Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards, 16 Univ. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 23, 26 (2007) (“At present, 
the NASD Code of Arbitration Rule 10330(e) requires only limited factual information, including a 
summary of the issues and the relief requested and awarded. Although the arbitrators may include the 
rationale underlying their decision in the award, they are not required to do so.”).
145. Black & Gross, supra note 71.
146. Id. (citing News Release, NASD, New Arbitration Rule Requires Award Explanations upon Investor 
Request (Jan. 27, 2005), http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2005/P013145).
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 Opponents of the rule change argued that lengthy opinions would unduly increase 
the cost and the length of the process without any tangible benefit, citing FINRA’s 
position prohibiting the use of a written rationale as binding precedent.147 It was also 
argued that a written rationale requirement would have the damaging side-effect of 
making arbitration so much like litigation that the courts would either swallow up 
the “pseudo-litigation” under their own jurisdiction and/or arbitration would no 
longer be a “cheap and speedy alternative to litigation.”148
 Investors have also argued that arbitrators should be educated on the securities 
laws.149 That is to say, even though arbitration is an equitable forum, resolving 
securities disputes simply cannot be equitable if arbitrators are free to disregard legal 
standards.150 People enter into investment contracts knowing that the securities laws 
operate to protect investors—this includes legal precedent pursuant to the securities 
statutes, rules, and regulations.151 Allowing arbitrations to operate primarily upon 
equitable principles has the paradoxical potential of leading to inequitable results.152 
Investors maintain that consistency and legal certainty is key, and both can only 
147. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendments Nos. 1 and 2, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-52009, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (July 15, 2005).
148. Grant, supra note 4, at 315. But c.f. Press Release, Center for Int’l Envtl. L., UN Body Supports 
Transparency in New Arbitration Rules ( July 3, 2008), available at http://www.ciel.org/Tae/
UNCITRAL_Transparency_3Jul08.html. The United Nations Commission on International Trade 
Law (“UNCITRAL”) recently mandated that the rules governing UNCITRAL be made more 
transparent in arbitrations brought by investors against States. Id. This is a clear example of reforming 
the existing arbitration system to ensure fairness rather than destructing the system. Despite these 
concerns, FINRA has continued to respond to investors’ perceived problems with the arbitration system, 
and on October 27, 2008, it resubmitted a revised proposal for comments. Notice of Filing of Proposed 
Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration Procedure to Require Arbitrators to 
Provide an Explained Decision upon the Joint Request of the Parties, Exchange Act Release No. 
34-58862 (Oct. 27, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/finra/2008/34-58862.pdf.
149. Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law through Arbitration, 56 Clev. St. L. Rev. 233, 268 (2008). 
Note that the NASD instructs arbitrators, “As arbitrators, you are not strictly bound by case precedent or 
statutory law. However, it’s important that you follow the underlying policies of the law.” NASD, 
Arbitrator Training Panel Member Course Preparation Guide 210 (1996) (on file with author). 
Although arbitrators are not required to be experts on securities laws, they are expected to understand the 
underlying policies. This implies recognition of the laws which carry out the underlying policies.
150. In arguing for a proposed rule change requiring a written explanation for an arbitration decision, one 
commentator argued that “[a]rbitrators are hiding gross incompetence and bias towards the securities 
firms when omitting any written explanation.” Cane & Torchinsky, supra note 143, at 38 (citing Letter 
from Richard Skora to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 3, 2005), available at http://www.sec.
gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032/rskora4644.pdf).
151. For example, in one Massachusetts case, notwithstanding the fact that Massachusetts law does not 
provide for punitive damages to securities investors, a U.S. District Court judge upheld an arbitrator’s 
award of $1.5 million in punitive damages. He reasoned that “arbitrators are given a ‘blank slate unless 
educated in the law by the parties.’” Noah Schaffer, U.S. District Court Upholds Panel ’s 1.5M Punitive 
Award, Mass. Law. Wkly., Aug. 20, 2006. Citigroup, the defendant in the case and in the arbitration, 
argued that “the arbitration panel, which included one lawyer, should have been familiar with the rule 
of ‘widespread familiarity’ and known that Massachusetts law—for more than 100 years—has prohibited 
punitive damages unless expressly authorized by statute.’” Id.
152. See id.
1151
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
happen if the insiders administering equitable justice are familiar with the parties’ 
expectations and the pre-existing rules and laws governing their expectations.153 
Noting just a small sampling of the problems that the Arbitration Fairness Act sets 
out to fix, the remainder of this note will explore other more effective ways of 
achieving reform—reform that preserves the existing, generally workable system.
 B. Existing Reform Efforts
  1. State Level Reform Efforts
 Significant reform efforts have already been made at the state level. There, the 
first wave of arbitration reform statutes sought to invalidate arbitration provisions in 
private contracts.154 In the lawsuits arising from these “first generation FAA 
preemption cases,” the Supreme Court held it unconstitutional under the FAA and 
the federal preemption doctrine for a state to ban arbitration entirely.155 Following 
judicial rejection of this legislative approach, states began to enact statutes that sought 
to reform arbitration procedures rather than to ban the process; however, the Supreme 
Court has yet to rule substantively on this type of reform statute.156
 As the most comprehensive attempt at procedural reform, the California State 
Legislature proposed ethics standards for arbitrators and codified these standards into 
the California Rules of Court.157 Arbitrators in California are now required to “disclose 
all matters that could cause a person aware of the facts to reasonably entertain a doubt 
that the proposed . . . arbitrator would be able to be impartial . . . .”158 In contrast, 
“[t]he SRO rules allow a party to request additional information about an arbitrator’s 
background from the Director of Arbitration, but there is no requirement that the 
requested additional information be provided.”159 California’s heightened disclosure 
requirements and additional disqualification standards were intended to promote 
greater public confidence in arbitration as a fair alternative to a judicial proceeding 
by allowing access to all information that may cause a potential arbitrator to have an 
otherwise undisclosed conflict of interest.160
153. See id.
154. Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 Ind. L.J. 393, 393 (2004).
155. Id. at 393–94; Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (holding that the FAA preempted such 
state statutes).
156. Drahozal, supra note 154, at 394; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) (granting 
review on the issue of FAA preemption involving a class, not an individual, without reaching the “second 
generation” preemption issue).
157. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.85(a) (West 2008); Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 
1097, 1100–01 (2003); Drahozal, supra note 153 at 394–95.
158. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1281.9 (West 2008); Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1100.
159. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
160. See Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1116; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.C., Reconsider Arbitration, 
N.Y. Times, May 6, 2007, § 3, at 1, available at http://select.nytimes.com/2007/05/06/business/
yourmoney/06gret.html?_r=1&oref=slogin (“Arbitrators’ selection raises fairness questions, too. Lawyers 
for both sides in a case choose panelists from a list of names and past awards. Panelists who want to be 
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 While these “second generation” reforms have not been invalidated under state 
law, in Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., a California federal district court held 
that under a private contract specifying that arbitration take place under NYSE rules, 
the California heightened disclosure standards were preempted by both NYSE rules 
and the FAA.161 The court made clear that any changes to the procedural aspects of 
securities arbitration must be made by the SEC, the administrative agency given 
congressional authority to oversee securities arbitration.162 However, it is not clear 
that the SEC would find such disclosure requirements in the best interest of the 
investing public. In fact, the Mayo court contemplated that it would probably not so 
find.163 Unfortunately, without the consent of the SEC, FINRA cannot take this 
reform approach—an approach that, if taken, would likely eliminate conf licts of 
interest—conflicts that contribute to the perceived pro-industry bias by investors.
  2. SRO-based Reforms
 Another existing avenue of reform is through the SROs themselves, particularly 
FINRA and the former-NASD. These SROs have consistently responded to 
investors’ complaints in adopting reforms “to improve the quality and fairness of the 
[arbitration] process.”164 As discussed earlier in this note, the former-NASD sought 
major reform in 2005 when it proposed and the SEC solicited comments on a new 
rule that would have required arbitrators to provide a factual, non-legal written 
rationale for his or her decision upon a customer’s request.165 During the review period 
following the SEC’s publication of the proposed rule change, the SEC received 
almost 200 comments.166 While the former-NASD, and thereafter FINRA, was 
reviewing the comments and formulating its response, SICA published an arbitration 
survey on “Perceptions of Fairness” and found that 55% of respondents would be 
“more satisfied if they had an explanation in the award.”167
hired again may shy away from making big awards to investors, fearing that firms will strike them from 
future panels.”).
161. Mayo, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 1108.
162. Id. at 1112.
163. Id. at 1110 n.16 (“Indeed, the SEC’s decision not to exercise its power under the Exchange Act to amend 
any SRO rules to accommodate the California standards and its approval of NYSE Arbitration Rule 
600(g) indicate that any rule changes proposed by SROs to accommodate the California standards 
likely would be met with disapproval by the SEC.”).
164. See Black & Gross, supra note 71.
165. See supra Part IV.B.1.; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment Nos. 1 and 2 Thereto, 
to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers, or of 
Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, Exchange Act Release No. 52009, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/34-52009.pdf.
166. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Codes of Arbitration 
Procedure to Require Arbitrators to Provide an Explained Decision upon the Joint Request of Parties, 
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 As a result of both the comments and subsequent developments, FINRA 
withdrew the 2005 proposal and resubmitted a new proposed rule for comments in 
October 2008.168 The 2008 rule proposed to require the chair of the arbitration panel 
to provide an explained decision upon joint request of the parties at least twenty days 
before the first scheduled hearing date.169 The explanation would be limited to a 
factual rationale and would not include legal authorities or a calculation of the 
damages.170
 On February 4, 2009, the SEC issued an order adopting the 2008 proposed rule 
change. As it currently stands, FINRA rules permit parties to submit a joint request 
for an explained decision no later than twenty days prior to the first scheduled 
hearing.171 The parties may limit their request to address only certain claims. If so 
requested, the Chairperson will assume responsibility to write only a fact-based 
explanation of the decision, for which he will be compensated.172 It should be noted 
that arbitrators would still retain the choice to write an explained decision on either 
their own motion or on the motion of one party only.173 As a matter of policy, the 
SEC stated that with respect to the rule adopted, it “believes that the even-handed 
approach of providing parties a means of jointly requesting a decision represents a 
reasonable compromise between the status quo, whereby the Code offers parties no 
formal means of requesting an explained decision, and the original proposal, whereby 
claimants alone would have the right to request an explained decision.”174
168. Id.
169. Id. at 6929.
170. Id.
171. This corresponds to the time period in which parties exchange documents and identify witnesses. Id.
172. The SEC suggested in its release that since the Chairperson must undergo specific training before 
being qualified to serve as the Chair, the additional experience would be beneficial toward producing 
higher-quality explained decisions. Id. Moreover, limiting the decision to only the facts would “ensur[e] 
the continued finality of a FINRA award.” Id. In addition, a rationale limited to the facts will be easily 
distinguishable from a judicial opinion—in such a way that there will be no confusion that the rationale 
is not precedent and is not an automatic means for judicial appeal.
173. Id. at 6930. It has been argued by some that the current proposal does not address sufficiently the interests 
of the small investor; that is, there is a heightened risk that big-business and/or industry insiders would 
block requests. This, in fact, ref lects the intent behind FINRA’s original proposal. However, after 
considering the 200 comment letters received, the SEC determined that a customer-only request was too 
one-sided. Id. at 6929. Moreover, such a one-sided rule would have potentially led to an increase in the 
number of motions to vacate filed on the civil dockets. As a compromise, FINRA stated that “any risks 
that may be associated with explained decisions should be borne by the parties only after they have agreed 
jointly to request an explained decision.” Id. at 6930. Because these are still valid concerns, however, the 
SEC had requested that FINRA gather statistics for a period of one year in order to determine whether 
parties are more often than not unable to agree to request an explained decision. Id.
174. Id. The requirement that both parties must agree to make a formal request for a written decision is a 
necessary limitation. Without it, the losing party may be always inclined to demand a rationale as a 
matter of right. Adopting such an absolute requirement would put a two-fold stress on arbitration: it 
would first eliminate the speediness of the process and make the process more costly, and secondly, it 
would lead arbitration down the legal path, rather than following in the direction of equity. Grant, 
supra note 4, at 315. (“[T]he danger is that the SRO procedures would become too similar to litigation. 
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  3. Other Congressional Action
 As a final means of existing reform efforts, congressional legislation offered another 
approach in the form of Senate Bill 1135, the Fair Arbitration Act of 2007 (“the Fair 
Arbitration Act”).175 Unlike the Arbitration Fairness Act, this bill would work within 
the existing arbitration system by amending the FAA to “grant several specific ‘due 
process’ rights to all parties to an arbitration proceeding.”176 Most significantly, the bill 
would require heightened requirements for arbitrator qualification and additionally 
mandates inclusion of a written explanation for the arbitrator’s basis for the decision.177 
Specifically, the bill would require, inter alia, that an arbitrator be “a member in good 
standing of the bar in the highest court of the State in which the hearing is to be held” 
and would require the arbitrator “[to] provide each party with a written explanation of 
the factual and legal basis for the decision.”178
 C. Effective Change: A Proposed Congressional Approach
 In examining the previously discussed existing reform efforts, proposed 
substantive state reforms to arbitration procedures have proved dubious at best and 
unconstitutional at worst.179 SRO-initiated rule changes could be meaningful; 
however, they occur as piecemeal, rule-by-rule amendments, and may take years to 
effectuate any substantial change.180 Additionally, congressional legislation that, 
while otherwise moderate, shifts the focus of arbitration from equity to law, has 
proven undesirable and unsuccessful.181 Therefore, Congress should take into account 
the policy behind state and SRO reform efforts, such as the California amendments 
and the FINRA proposed rule amendments, and should focus on preserving due 
process rights, as in the Fair Arbitration Act, in enacting amendments to the FAA. 
In making changes, federal law reform will use preemption from the top down, and 
thus force the SEC and FINRA to provide investors with better protection in the 
case they are harmed by unlawful industry action.182 Proponents of reform should 
To make arbitration more formal would be to have it more similar to the institution it seeks to replace—
the court. The result will be another legal institution.”).
175. Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).
176. 148 Cong. Rec. S9721 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sessions).
177. Fair Arbitration Act of 2007, S. 1135, 110th Cong. (2007).
178. Id. Unlike the Arbitration Fairness Act, which has over 100 co-sponsors and has gone through the 
hearing stage, the Fair Arbitration Act was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on April 
17, 2007 and has not proceeded further in the legislative process. Id.
179. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
180. See discussion supra Part IV.B.2. For example, the NASD made its original rule proposal regarding 
written rationales in early 2005 and re-proposed a revision in late 2008. This is a period of over three 
years without any meaningful change. Id.
181. See discussion supra Part IV.B.3.
182. The preemption doctrine finds its roots in Article VI, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution and refers to 
the supremacy of federal law over inconsistent state law. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 
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bear in mind the twin aims championed by investors and supported by securities law 
policy—those of enhanced transparency and disclosure throughout the arbitration 
dispute resolution process.183
 In sum, Congress should revisit the Fair Arbitration Act’s more moderate 
approach to reform, that is, an approach that maintains the time-tested arbitration 
forum, modifying the rules and regulations to afford more meaningful due process. 
Instead of amending the FAA to mandate legal requirements for arbitrator neutrality 
and written decisions, such as those proposed in the Fair Arbitration Act, it should 
adopt the California approach as federal law, thus mandating nationwide heightened 
disclosures for arbitrators. As discussed, public confidence in the markets is near its 
all-time low.184 In an attempt to eliminate any real or alleged industry bias by 
arbitrators and in turn promote public confidence, the California state legislature 
called for more stringent disclosures with respect to potential conflicts of interest.185 
Within the existing system, FINRA maintains a massive database of available 
arbitrators; with such vast personnel resources, there is no practical reason for limiting 
disclosures.186 Rather, disclosure benefits everyone: investors would be more confident 
that the system is not stacked against them, and the arbitration system would benefit 
by allowing a theoretically equitable forum to operate equitably.
 In addition to leveling the playing field by requiring heightened arbitrator 
disclosures of potential conf licts of interest, Congress should mandate more 
comprehensive standards for who can be an arbitrator.187 McMahon acknowledged 
that arbitration was a competent forum in which to vindicate statutory rights.188 Even 
though arbitration is an equitable forum, arbitrators should at least be cognizant of 
both the relevant law and how it operates to govern the legal relationships between 
investors and broker-dealers in order for arbitration to be a competent forum in which 
to vindicate statutory rights.
530 U.S. 363 (2000). Federal preemption is necessary to effectuate reform because, as discussed supra 
Part IV.B.1, state reform efforts have been struck down under this same preemption doctrine.
183. See Nagy, supra note 7, at 3.
184. On Monday, September 29, 2008, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 777.68 points after Congress 
failed to pass its first attempt at a bailout of Wall Street. At 7%, the Dow dropped even more than it did 
on September 11, 2001. Heather Landy and Renae Merle, A Record Fall on Wall Street: Stocks Dive as 
Bailout Bill Fails to Pass, Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 2008, at D01.
185. See Katsoris supra note 39, at 437.
186. FINRA, FINRA Dispute Resolution Fact Sheet, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/
AboutFINRADR/Overview/FactSheet/index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010) (“FINRA DR maintains 
a diverse roster of approximately 6,000 arbitrators and 1,000 mediators who are carefully selected from 
a broad cross-section of professions and backgrounds. Arbitrators are not FINRA employees.”).
187. The current requirements to become a FINRA arbitrator are: at least five years of business or professional 
experience and completion of at least two years of college-level credits. Arbitrators must also successfully 
complete FINRA’s basic arbitrator training. FINRA, Frequently Asked Questions About Becoming a 
FINRA Arbitrator, http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Neutrals/BecomeAnArbitrator/FAQ/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
188. 482 U.S. at 238.
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 Many professions require continuing education as a condition to maintaining a 
professional license.189 Under congressional reform legislation, the SEC and FINRA 
should follow suit and be required to implement an education program requiring a 
“continuing education” series of lectures and seminars to ensure that arbitrators are 
up to speed on the relevant securities laws.190 Even though it has been established 
that arbitrators are not required to per se apply the law, understanding the existing 
law is essential to reaching an equitable outcome in any arbitration proceeding.191 
Furthermore, Congress may consider extending some of the current FINRA 
requirements for an arbitrator chair to all arbitrators. These requirements are: (i) that 
a chair be a public arbitrator,192 (ii) complete FINRA arbitration training, and (iii) 
have a law degree or have completed a certain minimum level of experience on an 
arbitration panel.193 While Congress need not go so far as to require all arbitrators to 
be lawyers, the continued education training should be required of lawyers and non-
lawyers alike to ensure that all potential arbitrators have an up-to-date grasp on the 
applicable securities laws. Combined with ongoing education initiatives, investors 
participating in arbitration at FINRA can be assured that the arbitrators will use 
their background knowledge of the securities laws to reach equitable outcomes.
 Finally, Congress should vehemently reject the AFA’s additional proposal to 
repeal the doctrine of “competence-competence.” As noted, the proposed effect of 
the Arbitration Fairness Act would be to vest exclusive jurisdiction with the federal 
courts to determine arbitrability.194 Because this would take the jurisdiction decision 
away from the arbitrators, parties would have a nearly unhindered right to gain access 
to the courts simply by stating in their complaint that the arbitrator lacked 
jurisdiction.195 The real threat is that arbitration would no longer be an “alternative” 
form of dispute resolution. That is, parties would have no reason to choose arbitration 
in a world where each and every award was subject to virtually automatic judicial 
189. Key examples include education, medicine, and law. Using New York State as an example, see New York 
State Education Department, Office of the Professionals, NYS Dentistry, Continuing Education Q&A, 
http://www.op.nysed.gov/prof/dent/dentceques.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); New York State Bar 
Association, Mandatory CLE, New York Requirements, http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Secti
on=CLE&CONTENTID=2653&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); 
New York State Education Department, Professional Development for Professional Certificate Holders, 
http://www.highered.nysed.gov/tcert/certificate/maintaincrt-prof.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
190. Under the current system, arbitrators are only required to complete comprehensive training and pass a 
written examination. Although specialized continuing education courses are made available online, 
they not required. FINRA Dispute Resolution Fact Sheet, supra note 185.
191. See The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 142.
192. A public arbitrator is defined by FINRA in the negative as an arbitrator who is not a non-public 
arbitrator. FINRA rule 12100(u). In short, a public arbitrator is not associated with a broker-dealer, 
corporate-affiliated attorney, or employee of a bank or other financial institution. See id.
193. FINRA, Code of Arbitration Procedure, Rules 12400 and 13400.
194. See Paul Hastings Alert, supra note 86, at 4.
195. See id. at 1–2.
1157
nEW YOrK LaW sChOOL LaW rEViEW VOLUME 54 | 2009/10
review.196 Provided that Congress takes seriously the reforms that are necessary, 
investors should feel confident in a time-tested process that has served the public 
well for over eighty years.
V. COnCLUsiOn
 After the WorldCom and Enron accounting scandals in 2000, the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act197 provided for a new oversight board, the Public Companies Accounting 
Oversight Board (“PCAOB”), to ensure that accounting firms would be held to high 
standards.198 In large part, the creation of the PCAOB was meant to increase investor 
confidence in the securities markets by ensuring the accuracy of information provided 
in company financial statements.199 Although FINRA was not consolidated or 
created in response to an industry-wide scandal like the PCAOB was, its establishment 
was meant, in part, to reestablish investor confidence.200 With the recent severe 
downturn in the economy, Congress should seize on FINRA’s mandate to make 
securities arbitration meaningful to investors.201 There is no need to eliminate binding 
arbitration; however, the process should be made more transparent. Doing so would 
bring securities arbitration reform full circle; like the 1933 Act, it would aim to 
restore investor confidence and market integrity through informational disclosure.202
196. See id. at 2.
197. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., & 29 U.S.C.).
198. Public Companies Accounting Oversight Board, About the PCAOB, http://www.pcaobus.org/About_
the_PCAOB/index.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
199. Id.
200. News Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority – FINRA (July 30, 2007), http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/
NewsReleases/2007NewsReleases/P036329 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). FINRA’s Chief Executive 
Officer stated:
 With investor protection and market integrity as our overarching objectives, FINRA 
will be an investor-focused and more streamlined regulator that is better suited to the 
complexity and competitiveness of today’s global capital markets. By eliminating 
overlapping regulation and establishing a uniform set of rules placing oversight 
responsibility in a single organization, we will enhance investor protection while 
increasing the competitiveness of our financial markets.
 Id.
201. See id.
202. See Nagy, supra note 7 and accompanying text.
